Soliciting Sophisticates:  A Modest Proposal for Attorney Solicitation by Filippini, Victor P., Jr.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 16
1983 
Soliciting Sophisticates: A Modest Proposal for Attorney 
Solicitation 
Victor P. Filippini Jr. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and 
the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Victor P. Filippini Jr., Soliciting Sophisticates: A Modest Proposal for Attorney Solicitation, 16 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 585 (1983). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol16/iss3/11 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
SOLICITING SOPHISTICATES: A MODEST PROPOSAL 
FOR ATTORNEY SOLICITATION 
The legal profession is currently undergoing a period of close scrutiny, 
both by its members and the general public. 1 The American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) is in the midst of reconsidering its Code of Professional 
Responsibility and may soon replace the current code with the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 2 Both the Code and the Model Rules, 
however, like the Canons of Professional Ethics before them, have 
maintained a strict prohibition against the personal solicitation of pro-
spective clients for pecuniary gain. 3 This prohibition survives despite 
considerable criticism4 and judicial liberalization of promotional activities 
I. During the last several years, the American Bar Association (ABA) has undertaken 
an extensive review of its professional ethical standards. See Kutak, A Commitment to Clients 
and the Law, 68 A.B.A. J. 804 (1982). At its last two meetings in August 1982 and February 
1983, the ABA has debated the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Gest, 
Guilty Secrets Are Still Safe with Lawyers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 1983, at 84; 
Press, Lawyers' Ethics on Trial, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1982, at 37. These debates have not been 
confined to the legal profession; public comment on the recent ABA activities regarding client 
confidentiality has been vigorous. See, e.g., Lawyers on Trial, Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 1983, at 112; 
Stone, Are Lawyers So Specian, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 1983, at 76. 
2. The ABA project to revise professional ethics standards stemmed from the realization 
that the current Code of Professional Responsibility merely reorganized its predecessor, the Canons 
of Professional Ethics, without accommodating some of the needs of present-day legal practice. 
The project also marked an attempt to clarify apparent conflicts within the current ethical rules. 
See Kutak, supra note I, at 804-05. 
3. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3, EC 2-4, DR 2-103, DR 2-104 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as CPR]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (Revised 
Final Draft 1982) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES]; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 27, 28 
(1967) [hereinafter cited as CANONS). Each of these codes ·of ethics allows personal solicitation 
when warranted by personal relations; both the CPR and Model Rules explicitly extend these 
personal relations to former clients. See CPR, supra, DR 2-104(A)(I); MODEL RULES, supra, Rule 
7.3(a)(I). Although the prohibition against solicitation also precludes attorneys from requesting 
or compensating others for recommending employment, see CANONS, supra, at 28; CPR, supra, 
DR 2-103(8), (C); MODEL RULES, supra, Rule 7.2 comment, both the CPR and Model Rules per-
mit attorneys to accept employment of referrals from certain types of organizations, CPR, supra, 
DR 2-103(C)(l)-(2), (D); MODEL RULES, supra, Rule 7.3(a)(2)-(3). The Model Rules differ from 
the CPR in that their provision limits solicitation to those instances discussed above, whereas 
the CPR prohibits all solicitation except as discussed above. 
4. See, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 140-53 (1970); M. 
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 114-24 (1975); Pulaski, In-Person Solicita-
tion and the First Amendment: Was Ohralik Wrongly Decided?, 1919 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 23, 55, 
59-60; Schuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral 
Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244 (1968); Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private Litigation Under 
the First Amendment, 1918 WASH. U.L.Q. 93; Note, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State 
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by attorneys. s 
This Note advocates an amendment to the ethical standards govern-
ing attorneys6 that will permit the personal solicitation for pecuniary 
gain of sophisticated prospective clients - that is, those persons hav-
ing general knowledge of their legal needs and the expertise to assess 
adequately the information and presentation of an attorney. 7 Part I 
of this Note shows that lawyer solicitation is a form of commercial 
speech under recent Supreme Court decisions. It also asserts that, though 
the traditional reasons for banning lawyer solicitation still have some 
validity, these reasons do not justify prohibiting the solicitation of 
sophisticated clients. Part II suggests some potential benefits to the 
legal profession and clients resulting from the proposed solicitation 
amendment. In Part III, this Note offers a bright-line standard for 
"sophistication" that the bar might apply to this amendment so that 
lawyers can better determine the propriety of their activities. Finally, 
this Note concludes that adopting the amendment to permit the solicita-
tion of sophisticated persons will not drastically change the way lawyers 
Regulation after Primus and Ohralik, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 144, 176 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as Note, Attorney Solicitation]; Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to 
Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. ll81, ll84-85, passim (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, Advertising & Solicitation]. 
5. The first major break from restrictions on lawyer self-promotion activity occurred in Bates 
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), in which the Court struck down a general ban on lawyer 
advertising and ruled that advertising of price information for routine services was permissible 
commercial speech so long as it was not deceptive or misleading. Id. at 383. 
The Court has recently ruled that state regulation of permissible forms of advertising must 
be narrowly drawn and must advance a substantial state interest. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 
203 (1982). Thus, a state could not prohibit lawyer advertising that deviated slightly from specific 
language set out in the ethical rules. The Court also found a prohibition of mailings to non-
clients unreasonable, because no state interest was articulated to warrant so broad a restriction. 
Id. at 206. 
State courts have also contributed to the liberalization of attorney promotional activity. See, 
e.g., State Bar Grievance Adm'r v. Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 281 N.W.2d 469 (1979) (finding no 
improper solicitation by lawyer who solicited a union representative in person to recommend 
his services to union members, because representative's expertise and intermediary position did 
not create a potential for overreaching that warranted state prohibition); Koffler v. Joint Bar 
Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (holding that direct mail solicitation 
to potential clients by lawyer may be regulated but not prohibited), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 
(1980); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (holding that direct mail solicita-
tions cannot be prohibited). But see Greene v. Grievance Comm., 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 
390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981) (prohibiting direct mailing to real estate brokers requesting refer-
rals of clients for legal work), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982). 
6. For the purpose of this Note, the CPR and Model Rules will ordinarily be referred to 
jointly in the text as "ethical rules," "ethical code," or "ethical standards." Where relevant, 
differences between these codes will be discussed in the notes. 
References to "lawyers" and "attorneys" shall include both individual practitioners and those 
working jointly in partnerships or firms. Also, "ABA" and "legal profession" will be treated 
as synonymous. 
7. See Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 58 F.R.D. 373, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1972); State Bar Grievance 
Adm'r v. Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 38, 281 N.W.2d 469, 470 (1979). 
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attract new clients, and will benefit both lawyers and consumers of 
legal services by recognizing their legitimate commercial speech interests. 
I. RECONSIDERING STATE INTERESTS BEHIND THE PROHIBITION 
OF SOLICITATION 
Solicitation by attorneys, whether through advertising or personal 
contact, has long been discouraged within the legal profession. 8 Although 
disapproval of lawyer advertising and solicitation originally was regarded 
as a rule of etiquette, 9 the ABA officially denounced solicitation as 
unprofessional in its original Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908. 10 
When the ABA revised its ethical guidelines in 1969 by adopting its 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the disciplinary rules 
specifically made improper both advertising and private communica-
tions with prospective clients. 11 Since then, the profession has consi~ 
tently opposed personal solicitation in ethical opinions, 12 and state courts 
have prohibited nearly every kind of personal solicitation of legal 
business. 13 
A. Advertising and Solicitation as 
Commercial Speech 
The ABA prohibitions of advertising and solicitation were adopted 
8. Even as the bar was first forming in Britain, lawyers who advertised or solicited employ-
ment were viewed unfavorably by other members of the bar. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 
210-12 (1953). This tradition has continued in the United States, receiving official professional 
approval in 1908 when the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics first appeared. See id. at 25. 
See supra note 3. 
9. H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 211 n.6. 
10. "But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communica-
tions, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional." CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS 27 (1908). 
11. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3, 2-4, DR 2-101, 2-103, 2-104 (1969). The 
major difference between the original Code and the CPR is the treatment of advertising. The 
1969 Code strictly prohibited such publicity, whereas the CPR merely regulates advertising ac-
tivity. Compare id. DR 2-101 with CPR, supra note 3, DR 2-101. 
12. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. I (1924) 
("Canon 27 ... disapproves all forms of solicitation as unprofessional"); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1456 (1980) (stating that lawyer may not 
send letter to other lawyers requesting referrals); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal 
Op. 757 (1964) (stating that law firm with limited practice cannot entertain prospective clients). 
13. State court decisions disciplining attorneys for various acts of solicition ordinarily in-
volve laypersons unsophisticated in legal matters. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 368 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 
1979) (finding unlawful solicitation when lawyer approached high school athlete seeking to become 
his legal representative); In re Perrello, 270 Ind. 390, 394 N.E.2d 127 (1979) (disbarring lawyer 
for seeking employment by approaching individuals in the hallways of municipal court). Still, there 
appears to be no disciplinary proceedings involving the solicitation of sophisticated persons, and 
some support exists that these persons were not contemplated to be within the coverage of non-
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and enforced by many states until 1977, 14 when the Supreme Court 
ruled that self-promotional activity by attorneys was commercial speech 
and entitled to some protections against state encroachments. 15 In Bates 
v. State Bar, 16 the Court struck down a blanket prohibition against 
advertising because it was an excessive restriction of freedom of speech. 11 
The court ruled that the state had a legitimate interest in preventing 
deceptive and misleading advertising, 18 but held that truthful, dignified, 
and informative advertisements regarding routine services fell under 
the protection of the first amendment. 1 9 
Although Bates illustrated that the main function of regulations on 
advertising was consumer protection, 20 the Supreme Court did not 
address the rationale behind the rules regarding personal solicitation 
until 1978. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 21 the Court found 
that in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain was commercial speech, but 
that a state has a right to prohibit solicitation under circumstances likely 
to involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, or other 
forms of "vexatious conduct. " 22 
According to Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, however, there 
solicitation rules. See Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 282 Ky. 734, 739, 139 S.W.2d 773, 775 
(1940) ("An attorney may personally solicit business with impunity, where he does not take ad-
vantage of the ignorance, or weakness, or suffering, or human frailties of the expected client .... "). 
14. By 1977, all 50 states and the District of Columbia granted some form of official recognition 
to the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility, though most states modified various provi-
sions of the Code. See COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1977). After the decision in Bates v. State Bar, 
433 U.S. 350 (1977), the ABA extensively amended the provisions on lawyer advertising; the 
states followed suit. See Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808,808 (1982). 
15. For discussions on the constitutional status of commercial speech, see generally Alex-
ander & Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory: A Critical Exchange, 75 
Nw. U.L. REV. 307 (1980); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 372 (1979). 
16. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
17. Bates and another attorney, O'Steen, established a legal clinic to handle routine (mostly 
uncontested) matters at low costs. They relied on a high volume of business to sustain the clinic, 
so they advertised some of the clinic's services and prices in violation of existing disciplinary 
rules that prohibited advertising. 
18. 433 U.S. at 383-84. 
19. See id. at 372-77. 
20. See id. at 372-75, 379, 383-84. 
21. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The Court also decided a companion case, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 
412 (1978), that involved an attorney who contacted a prospective client by letter on behalf of 
the ACLU. Although the letter was written on the stationery of her law firm, the Court reversed 
disciplinary action against Primus because her solicitation was "to advance the civil-liberties 
objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain." Id. at 422. This gave the solicita-
tion full first amendment protections that could be affected only by narrow regulations that 
advanced the state's interest in preventing misleading, overbearing, or other improper conduct. 
Id. at 438-39. The associational and political interests in Primus received greater protection than 
the commercial speech interests in Ohralik. 
22. 436 U.S. at 449, 462, 464. 
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are situations in which solicitation cannot be prohibited. Marshall noted · 
that, by visiting the home and hospital room of two teenage girls who 
had been injured in an automobile accident, the lawyer Ohralik engaged 
in a classic example of "ambulance chasing." 23 Accordingly, Ohralik's 
misconduct stemmed not from his solicitations, "but rather the cir-
cumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by 
which he accomplished it. " 24 Marshall suggested that "benign" soli-
citation, "where honest, unpressured 'commercial' solicitation is 
involved," should be permitted as a legitimate form of commercial 
speech subject only to narrowly drawn restrictions. 25 
In In re R.M.J ., 26 the Court again considered the legitimacy of restric-
tions on attorney commercial speech. The state of Missouri had dis-
ciplined an attorney for advertisements that had deviated from specific 
wording mandated by the state as well as for violating a prohibition 
against direct mailings to prospective clients. The Court held that, absent 
a showing that these rules promoted important state interests without 
being overly restrictive, the rules violated the attorney's first amend-
ment rights. 21 In reaching its decision, the Court applied the commer-
cial speech analysis set out in Central Hudson Gas Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission, 28 which requires the state to assert a substantial state 
interest and to show that the interference with speech is proportional 
to the interest served. 29 
These recent decisions indicate how the Supreme Court has assumed 
the responsibility of defining the scope of permissible state restrictions 
on self-promotional activities by lawyers. Although states can regulate 
the time, place, and manner of these activities, 30 the Court will only 
approve broader restrictions if they promote important state interests. 
To determine the validity of the ABA's prohibitions of solicitation 
therefore requires a consideration of the interests underlying these rules. 
23. Id. at 469. For a definition of "ambulance chasing," see Note, Advertising, Solicitation 
and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REV. 677, 684 n.43 (1954). 
24. 436 U.S. at 470. . 
25. Id. at 472 n.3, 476. Although "benign" solicitation may be the proper scope of solicita-
tion rules, see Comment, Benign Solicitation of Clients by Attorneys, 54 WASH. L. REv. 671, 
688-89 ( 1979), such a standard is not sufficiently instructive to be an operative provision in the 
professional ethics code. Because of the inherent dangers and traditional prohibitions of in-person 
solicitation, this Note advocates a bright-line test for determining the proper bounds of solicita-
tion. See infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text. 
26. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
27. Id. at 207. The Court also said: "States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain 
types of potentially misleading information ... if the information may be presented in a way 
that is not deceptive." Id. at 203. 
28. 447 U.S. 557, 563-64, 566 (1980). 
29. 455 U.S. at 207. The Court in R.M.J. indicated that the state has the burden of showing 
the legitimacy of its restrictions on commercial speech. 
30. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. 
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B. Evaluating the Need for Nonsolicitation Rules 
Because the states have relied heavily on the ABA in formulating 
ethical standards, 31 the legal profession retains extensive self-regulatory 
powers. Besides its traditional disapproval of in-person solicitation, 32 
the legal profession has prohibited such solicitation for four primary 
reasons. 
First, the bar has sought to protect the public from unscrupulous 
lawyers and to prevent laypersons from making uninformed decisions 
when selecting a lawyer. 33 The dangers of deception, overreaching, undue 
influence, intimidation, and misrepresentation have prompted the ban 
on in-person solicitation. 34 As a result, attorneys have been forced to 
depend upon client-initiated business relationships, relying on their pro-
fessional and personal reputations to attract new clients. 35 Ironically, 
Bates showed that total bans on advertising and solicitation do not 
clearly address consumer protection concerns, because they restrict the 
flow of information to potential clients regarding legal services. Indeed, 
such bans represent a misconception of how reputational information 
is disseminated in a complex urban setting. 36 
31. See supra note 14. 
32. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
33. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457, 460; Primus, 436 U.S. at 445; People v. Kitsis, 77 Cal. 
App. 3d Supp. I, 6, 143 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978); State 
v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 246, 642 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1982); Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 
So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (La. App. 1979); Woll v. Kelley, 409 Mich. 500, 525-26, 297 N.W.2d 578, 
588-89 (1980); Hahn v. Boeing Co., 95 Wash. 28, 35, 621 P.2d 1263, 1267 (1980); CPR, supra 
note 3, EC 2-8, 2-9; G. ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER §§ 129-30, at 240-41 
(1910); 0. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 59 (1915); H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 
212; Pulaski, supra note 4, at 39; Simet, supra note 4, at 108; Comment, Solicitation by the 
Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 77, 90 (1973). 
See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (Blackmun, 
J ., concurring) ("Permissible restraints on commercial speech have been limited to measures 
designed to protect consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques."). 
34. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462; Primus, 436 U.S. at 426; Florida Bar re Amendment to 
Integration Rule, 399 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1981); In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204,211 (Minn. 
1981); MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 7.3 comment; Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the 
First Amendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 967, 976; Note, Advertising & Solicita-
tion, supra note 4, at 1184-85; Comment, supra note 25, at 677. 
In-person solicitation also poses the danger of conflicting interests where a lawyer subordinates 
the best interests of his client to his own interests. Courts have expressed special concern when 
the lawyer's interest is pecuniary, see, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461 n.19, and conflicting in-
terests has become one of many justifications for solicitation bans. The concern over conflicting 
interests seems exaggerated after Primus, however, because lawyers can have their better judg-
ment of the clients' needs blurred as easily by their political or civic interests as by their pecuniary 
ones. Pulaski, supra note 4, at 56-57. Furthermore, regulations to avoid conflicting interests 
need not be so broad as to ban solitication. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 
& Rule 1.7 comment (Lawyer's Interest). 
35. See CPR, supra note 3, EC 2-3, 2-6; G. ARCHER, supra note 33, § 127, at 239; B. 
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 4, at 128-30. 
36. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374 n.30. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 4, at 131-34; Canby, Com-
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A second reason for prohibiting solicitation is to preserve the stan-
dards and dignity of the profession. Because lawyers are officers of 
the court, undignified conduct could reflect badly on the entire system 
of justice. 37 In addition, lower professional standards could diminish 
the overall quality of legal services to society's detriment. Although 
these interests are important, the ban on in-person solicitation does 
not clearly protect either of them. The connection between solicitation 
and the erosion of professionalism is at best weak. 38 Moreover, con-
tacting prospective clients in person is not per se undignified; discreet 
and informative solicitations can reinforce the professionalism of lawyers 
in the eyes of the public39 and enhance the administration of justice. 40 
A third reason for prohibiting solicitation aims at maintaining the 
mercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady Course, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 401, 414-15 
(1980); Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 
WILLAMETTE L.J. 221, 237-38 (1977); Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and 
Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 371 (1970); Comment, supra note 25, at 678. 
One might argue that the availability of advertising solves the problem of restricting informa-
tion on attorney reputation. Although this might be true for ordinary laypersons, it is less con-
vincing when sophisticated persons are involved. Sophisticated persons acquire reputational in-
formation through a network that includes large established law firms. See B. CHRISTENSEN, 
supra note 4, at 130; Note, Advertising & Solicitation, supra note 4, at 1203. Having an effective 
information system, these sophisticated persons need not, and probably do not, rely on adver-
tisements for additional information. Id. Thus, smaller firms that are outside this network have 
no means of reaching sophisticated clients other than through personal solicitation. See also Lin-
mark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977); Virginia State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (holding that 
states can restrict informational commercial messages so long as the restrictions "leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information"). 
37. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); State Bar Grievance Adm'r 
v. Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 48-49, 281 N.W.2d 469, 475 (1979) (Coleman, C.J., dissenting); CPR, 
supra note 3, EC 2-4, 9-6; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 7.3 comment; ABA Comm. on 
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. I (1924); id., Formal Op. 8 (1925); H. DRINKER, 
supra note 8, at 212; Note, supra note 23, at 677; Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against 
Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 675 (1958). 
38. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 ("the postulated connection between advertising and true pro-
fessionalism [is] severely strained"); In re Utah State Bar Petition for Appraisal of Changes 
in Disciplinary Rules on Advertising, 647 P.2d 991, 998 (Utah 1982) (Durham, J., dissenting) 
(doubting whether requirement of dignified advertising will benefit potential clients); B. 
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 4, at 152; Note, Advertising & Solicitation, supra note 4, at 1190; 
Comment, supra note 37, at 68. See also supra note 34 (discussing quality of service when lawyer 
has conflicting interests). 
Even if under some circumstances a correlation between solicitation and declining professional 
standards could be established, a total ban on solicitation would still be inappropriate because 
the restrictions would be broader than necessary. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
Other, more effective methods can be employed to uphold professional standards. 
39. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 369-71; L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN 77 (1980), 8. 
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 4, at 151-53. To avoid potential harms from undignified presentations 
by lawyers, restrictions narrower than a total ban can be employed. See, e.g., CPR, supra note 
3, DR 2-101 (A), (8). 
40. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 376. To the extent that solicitation might stimulate frivolous lawsuits, 
direct restrictions can be formulated. See, e.g., CPR, supra note 3, DR 7-102; MoDEL RULES, 
supra note 3, Rule 3.1. 
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self-perceived status of lawyers. Because lawyers view themselves as 
members of a learned profession performing a public service, they have 
sought to avoid the commercialism of ordinary trades and businesses. 4 ' 
Yet, the concern that commercialization will lower the status of lawyers 
is an insufficient reason for limiting solicitation. It stems from prof es-
sional hubris rather than concerns for the general public welfare. Because 
restrictions on commercial speech must advance a substantial state 
interest, 42 the status of the bar is not a legitimate reason for prohibiting 
attorney solicitation. 43 
A final reason for banning solicitation is to promote harmony among 
members of the bar by preventing "client stealing. " 44 Although this 
may advance good relations among lawyers, it causes the more obvious 
economic effect of limiting competition. Not only is such harmony 
not a state interest, 4 5 but it clearly violates national policy as reflected 
in strong antitrust laws designed to halt just this type of anticompeti-
tive behavior. 46 
41. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal 
Op. 148 (1935) (stating that solicitation is improper because it commercializes the bar; "[T]he 
practice of law is a profession and not a trade."); Pulaski, supra note 4, at 55; Note, supra 
note 23, at 684; Comment, supra note 37, at 675. 
42. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
43. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 371-72; B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 4, at 152; Note, Advertising 
& Solicitation, supra note 4, at 1189-90. See also Shadur, The Impact of Advertising and Specialiw-
tion on Professional Responsibility, 61 Cm. B. REC. 324, 324 (1980) (nonsolicitation rules are 
"trade unionist and not public-oriented in nature"). 
In addition, much of the recent criticism of the bar stems not from commercialization, but 
from ethical neutrality. See, e.g., Schanberg, To Tell The Truth, We Can't, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
12, 1983, at 19, col. 4; Lawyers for Hire for Anything?, N.Y. Times, Feb~ II, 1983, at 26, 
col. I (each criticizing the ABA's decision preventing lawyers from disclosing criminal conduct 
of clients). To the extent commercialization has harmed the status of the bar, the cause has 
been attorneys' concern with fees rather than their efforts at attracting clients. See Press, supra 
note I, at 37. 
44. See CPR, supra note 3, EC 2-30; G. ARCHER, supra note 33, §§ 67, 69, at 146-47, 149; 
H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 190-91, 211 n.6; Khactu, Advertising, Market Power and the Public 
Interest: The Lawyers' Case, 55 N.D.L. REV. 525, 547 (1979). Some have claimed that the restric-
tion against client stealing is intended to curtail competition among attorneys. See M. FREED-
MAN, supra note 4, at I 14-15; Francis & Johnson, supra note 36, at 244-47; Morgan, The Evolv-
ing Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 721-22 (1977); Rigler, Pro-
fessional Codes of Conduct after Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust Analysis, 29 ARK. 
L. REV. 185, 197-98 (1975). But see Comment, Advertising and the Legal Profession: An Analysis 
of the Requirements of the Sherman Act and the First Amendment, 8 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. 
REv. 67, 79 (1976) (claiming that advertising and soliciting restraints limit competition to pro-
tect smaller firms from encroachment by larger firms). 
45. Although the efficient administration of justice requires a certain amount of cooperation 
between opposing attorneys, ethical codes already outline duties that lawyers have as officers 
of the court. See, e.g., CPR, supra note 3, EC 7-19 to -39, DR 7-102, 7-106; MODEL RULES, 
supra note 3, Rule 3.4. There is no important state interest in merely trying to promote good 
feelings among attorneys, though a modicum of courtesy is expected. See In re Crumpacker, 
269 Ind. 630, 383 N.E.2d 36 (1978), cert denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979). 
46. See Sherman Antitrust Act§ I, 15 U.S.C. § I (1976). Although the Supreme Court found 
no Sherman Act violation in Bates, the decision hinged on state action immunity. 433 U.S. at 
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In promulgating rules covering solicitation, the ABA has properly 
concerned itself with protecting prospective clients from unscrupulous 
attorneys and promoting the dignity of the judicial system. 47 To the 
extent that the ABA has developed rules against solicitation to avoid 
commercialization and client stealing, however, it merely promotes 
private concerns of the bar. These concerns are not state interests that 
justify restrictions on commercial speech. 
C. Discarding Nonso/icitation Rules for 
Sophisticated Persons 
Although some state interests may justify the prohibition of in-person 
solicitation in many situations, these situations do not include the 
solicitation of "sophisticated" persons. Such persons do not require 
ordinary consumer safeguards against overreaching, undue influence, 
and intimidation, because they have the expertise to evaluate the pro-
motional appeals of an attorney. 48 Nor do they need special rules to 
guard against deception; current ethical standards already prohibit 
misleading or deceptive communications. 49 
The state interests in preserving the dignity of the profession and 
' the judicial system do not warrant prohibiting solicitations of 
sophisticated persons. Because these persons will have some knowledge 
of their legal needs, attorneys will presumably be most effective by 
presenting their service offerings in a dignified fashion. Information, 
359-63. A state may have interests that justify noncompetition among attorneys, see infra note 
68, but promoting professional harmony is not one of them. See also Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (disallowing state action immunity for a home-
rule city in the absence of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to restrain 
trade). 
47. Both Canon 2 of the CPR and Part 7 of the Model Rules focus on the interaction of 
lawyers with nonclients, and specific provisions appear in both Codes. See, e.g., CPR, supra 
note 3, EC 2-3, 2-4, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, DR 2-101 (A), (B), 2-103, 2-104; MODEL RULES, supra note 
3, Rules 1.7, 7.1, 7.3(b). Similarly, Canon 7 of the CPR and Part 3 of the Model Rules set 
out to regulate lawyers in their capacity as officers of the court. See, e.g., CPR, supra note 
3, EC 7-19 to -39, DR 7-102, 7-106; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rules 3.1, 3.4. 
48. See State Bar Grievance' Adm'r v. Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 281 N.W.2d 469 (1979); see 
also supra note 5. To the extent a sophisticated person is temporarily unable to make such evalua-
tions, rules other than solicitation bans can afford them protection. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, 
supra note 3, Rule 7.3(b). 
Although courts have acknowledged invasions of privacy as potential dangers of solicitation, 
see Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461; In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Minn. 1981), the proposal 
in this Note raises no such problem, because it identifies sophisticated persons primarily as business 
enterprises. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. Such enterprises have a lesser right 
of privacy than individuals, see Annot., 43 L. Ed. 2d 871, 881 (1976), and specific rules can 
protect privacy interests without banning solicitation, see, e.g., MooEL RULES, supra note 3, 
Rule 7 .3(b)(2). 
49. CPR, supra note 3, DR 2-lOl(A); MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 7.1. 
594 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:3 
rather than a stylish presentation, will likely impress sophisticated per-
sons. Thus, there is an aspect of self-interest to deter lawyers from 
undignified behavior when sophisticated prospective clients are 
involved. so In addition, lawyer advertising has apparently not affected 
perceptions of the dignity of the profession, s I nor has it given reason 
to expect negative perceptions resulting from the use of "benign" 
solicitation. 52 
Thus, solicitation of sophisticated persons will not conflict with the 
longstanding and legitimate interests of the ABA in protecting con-
sumers of legal services and preserving the dignity of the profession 
as an arm of the judicial system. Yet, allowing the solicitation of 
sophisticated persons as this Note proposes will promote the commer-
cial speech interests of lawyers and potential clients by removing cur-
rent restrictions that are unnecessary to protect sophisticated persons. 
As Part II will show, this will help to improve the public image of 
attorneys and their service offerings to clients. 
II. BENEFITING LAWYERS AND CLIENTS THROUGH THE 
SOLICITATION OF SOPHISTICATES 
The proposed change allowing the solicitation of sophisticated per-
sons is preferable to current ABA standards simply because it will protect 
the same interests without restricting the free flow of information. This 
50. "Also, many of the most desirable clients, imbued with the high respect both for their 
lawyer and his calling, would have no use for a lawyer who did not maintain the dignity and 
standards of his profession .... " H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 212. 
This view finds considerable indirect support in the way many attorneys practice indirect 
or "genteel" solicitation, where success often depends on cultivating friendly social relations 
as a prelude to business associations. See id. at 218; Francis & Johnson, supra note 36, at 246; 
Schuchman, supra note 4, at 256; Note, supra note 23, at 684-85. 
51. Existing data on the effect of advertising on consumer attitudes are limited. Before their 
recent survey on lawyer and consumer attitudes toward attorney advertising, Professors Linenberger 
and Murdock had reviewed earlier studies and noted "the lack of compelling evidence that adver-
tising will harm the image of the profession in the consumers' eyes." Murdock & Linenberger, 
Legal Advertising and Solicitation, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 627, 665-66 (1981). In their own 
study, they found that consumers "do not characterize advertising attorneys as bad or feel that 
advertising would create a bad image for the profession." Linenberger & Murdock, Legal Ser-
vice Advertising: Wyoming Attorney Attitudes Compared with Wyoming Consumer Attitudes, 
17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 209, 240 (1982). The study did indicate, however, that attorneys 
believed that advertising would harm the image of the profession. Id. 
52. There is some belief that advertising may benefit the image of attorneys by providing 
more information to consumers. See Linenberger & Murdock, supra note 51, at 226-26 (citing 
study that found 800/o of consumers disagreeing with the idea that advertising creates a bad 
public image of lawyers; over 800/o agreed, however, that advertising would make the public 
more aware and more able to make informed choices of attorneys). Because in-person solicita-
tion can benefit prospective clients by providing more detailed information than advertising, 
see Andrews, supra note 14, at 811; Shadur, supra note 43, at 327; Simet, supra note 4, at 
104, it could result in more positive benefits to the profession's image than advertising. Also, 
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Note's proposal, however, will have other potential advantages in terms 
of the general reputation of the bar and the overall opportunities for 
better service to clients. 
A. Improving the Public Image of 
Attorneys 
Reports are rife about the low esteem of lawyers in the eyes of the 
public. 53 Lawyers are commonly criticized for being dishonest54 and 
for looking after their own interests and those of their clients over 
those of the public." Although permitting the solicitation of 
sophisticated persons will not, of itself, dramatically enhance the reputa-
tion of lawyers in these regards, it is an important first step in improv-
ing the perceived integrity and social awareness of lawyers. 
Most importantly, the proposed change gives the bar the opportunity 
to take the lead in protecting the legitimate commercial speech interests 
of both lawyers and prospective clients, 56 thus reversing the recent trend 
of having the Supreme Court develop ethical standards as in Bates," 
In re Primus, ss and R.M.J. 59 The Ohra/ik decision strongly suggested 
that the Court will not tolerate prohibitions of solicitation when no 
significant dangers of overreaching face prospective clients. 60 By 
adopting the change proposed in this Note, the ABA can reassert its 
ability to regulate itself independently and avoid being once again over-
ruled by the Court. 
Second, because much of the public disaffection with lawyers stems 
personal solicitation may be the only available option for lawyers hoping to initiate business 
contacts with sophisticated persons. See supra note 36. 
Although the proposal in this Note is more restrictive than Justice Marshall's notion of benign 
solicitation, see supra note 25 and accompanying text, it will permit the bar to enter the realm 
of permissible solicitation cautiously. Thus, the experience with the solicitation of sophisticated 
persons can instruct the bar on how and whether to allow more general solicitations. 
53. See, e.g., L. ANDREWS, supra note 39, at 77; Schanberg, What Price a Waiter's Life?, N.Y. 
Times, June 22, 1982, at A27, col. 2. 
54. Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 LAW 
& SOC"Y REV. 427, 436-37 (1977); Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202,202 
(1978); Harris, Lawyers' Abuse, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1981, at 23, cols. 3-4. Much of this stems 
from Watergate and the role of lawyers in the scandal. See Auerbach, The Legal Profession 
after Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1287 (1976); Waltz, The UnpopularityofLawyersinAmerica, 
25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 143 (1976). 
55. See, e.g., Lawyers on Trial, supra note 1, at 112; Stone, supra note 1, at 76. 
56. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
756-57 (1976) ("[T]he protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its reci-
pient both .... If there is a right to advertise, there is a: reciprocal right tci receive the advertis-
ing .... "). 
51. See supra notes 5 & 14-19 and accompanying text. 
58. See supra note 21. 
59. See supra notes 5 & 26-29 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
596 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:3 
from well-publicized wrongdoings of attorneys, 61 the change in solicita-
tion restrictions may help counter the image of lawyers as being 
dishonest. Specifically, the change will eliminate an element of hypocrisy 
that currently exists in the enforcement of the profession's ethical stan-
dards. Although the ABA has officially proscribed in-person solicita-
tion from the time of the original Canons of Professional Ethics, it 
has nevertheless permitted attorneys to solicit indirectly by cultivating 
business ties through social, civic, and religious activities. 62 The primary 
motive of these attorneys is often no less economic than that of many 
"ambulance chasers"; their methods, however, are considered less 
objectionable. 63 Because direct appeals for business rely on informa-
tion rather than tenuous personal relations, they can off er potential 
clients a more rational basis for selecting an attorney than indirect 
solicitations. 64 By officially permitting the solicitation of sophisticated 
persons, the ABA would close the gap between its rules and the con-
duct of those lawyers who currently solicit indirectly. 65 
61. See supra note 54. 
62. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 783 (1964) ("[L]aw practice is 
legitimately obtained through friendships and that friendship can be developed by entertainment, 
playing golf, or by any one of many other ways."); See also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 
116-17; Francis & Johnson, supra note 36, at 246; Note, supra note 23, at 684-85. 
63. See In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 196, 139 N.E.2d 301,304 (1956) (Bristow, J., concurring); 
H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 218; Agate, Legal Advertising and the Public Interest, 50 L.A.B. 
BULL. 209, 241 (1975); Francis & Johnson, supra note 36, at 246; Pulaski, supra note 4, at 
55; Schuchman, supra note 4, at 256; Note, supra note 23, at 679. See also Hearn v. Commis-
sioner, 309 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1962) (suggesting lawyer's membership fees for private club 
can be a business expense for generating new clients). A number of commentators have noted 
that the brunt of nonsolicitation rules is borne primarily by new attorneys, solo practitioners, 
and small partnerships to the benefit of large established practices, see M. FREEDMAN, supra 
note 4, at 115; Francis & Johnson, supra note 36, at 241-42; Schuchman, supra note 4, at 245-46; 
Simet, supra note 4, at 106-07; Note, Attorney Solicitation, supra note 4, at 176; Comment, 
supra note 25, at 678-79, which often include the leaders of the bar who promulgate and enforce 
the restrictions, see Francis & Johnson, supra note 36, at 245-46, 267; Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny 
of Bar Restraints on Advertising and Solicitation by Attorneys, 62 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1164-65 
(1976); Note, Advertising & Solicitation, supra note 4, at 1203-04; Comment, supra .note 36, 
at 351-52. 
64. Social relations can protect prospective clients by restraining lawyers from making misleading 
or deceptive statements. Also, because social ties might often result in the prospective client in-
itiating business discussions, the likelihood of overreaching is less than in personal solicitations. 
Nevertheless, the social relations developed through indirect solicitation, unlike personal solicita-
tions, often give no indication of an attorney's professional approach or knowledge of a prob-
lem. Moreover, regarding sophisticated persons, the protective benefits from social relations are 
overstated because they need fewer protections. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text; 
see also Greene v. Grievance Comm., 54 N.Y.2d 118, 133, 429 N.E.2d 390, 398, 444 N.Y.S.2d 
883, 891 (1981) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that direct mailings to real estate brokers 
requesting referrals is no worse than "the far more amorphous collection of contacts with the 
coterie of friends, relatives, business or social acquaintances, and former clients who constitute 
the main source ... for referrals"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982). 
65. A number of commentators have remarked that this gap between the ethical code and 
the conduct of attorneys harms the legitimacy of the code and the profession. See J. CARLIN, 
LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 156-57 (1962); Schnapper, supra note 54, at 203; Comment, So/icita-
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Finally, the change in solicitation rules can counter recent criticisms 
that the ABA treats itself and its members as if they are not bound 
by external standards. 66 The current ethical standards have lent credence 
to this criticism by expressly disapproving competition for persons who 
are already represented by an attorney. 67 There is no substantial need 
for restricting competition for sophisticated clients, whether or not they 
are already represented. 68 The legal profession should avoid taking a 
stance so contrary to the antitrust laws. As officers of the court, lawyers 
should not merely follow the letter of the law; they should be exemplars 
of its spirit. 69 Condoning the solicitation of sophisticated clients will 
be a step in that direction. 
B. Improving Service Offerings to 
Clients 
The renewed competition resulting from the proposed change will 
not only improve the image of lawyers to the public, it will provide 
sophisticated consumers with the opportunity for more informed choices 
when selecting a lawyer and the possibility of lower legal bills. Both 
of these results allow the legal profession to better serve the public. 
Current ethical standards discourage lawyers from contacting 
tion by Attorneys: A Prediction and a Recommendation, 16 Hous. L. REV. 452, 477-78 (1979); 
see also In re Leopold, 469 Pa. 384,394 n.12, 366A.2d 227,232 n.12 (1976) (finding that lenient 
enforcement of ethical codes harms the public, the courts, and the profession). 
Besides closing the gap between the ethical rules and the conduct of members, the proposal 
in this Note has the additional benefit of enabling the less well-connected lawyers to seek clients 
actively within the professional code. Although it may not eliminate the economic classes of 
lawyers, see supra note 63, it will reduce some of the structural barriers between those classes, 
see supra note 36. 
66. See, e.g., Gest, supra note 1, at 84; Stone, supra note 1, at 76. Although these examples 
refer specifically to ABA rules on the lawyer's obligation to disclose a client's criminal conduct, 
they represent a more general criticism that the proposed change can help to reduce. 
67. See CPR, supra note 3, EC 2-30 ("If a lawyer knows a client has previously obtained 
counsel, he should not accept employment in the matter."). See also supra note 44. 
68. There might be a need to protect from competition unsophisticated clients who have satisfac-
tory relations with an attorney. Because these clients are unable to evaluate the abilities of an 
attorney, subjecting them to new offerings from other attorneys could undermine the goal of 
providing adequate representation to all people. The proposed standard does not, however, af-
fect such clients. It only allows competition among attorneys for sophisticated clients. Courts 
have recognized that regulations of promotional and competitive activities can vary according 
to the sophistication of those involved. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 n.37; United 
States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd, 435 
U.S. 679 (1978). 
69. See CPR, supra note 3, Preamble ("As guardians of the law, ... [a] consequent obliga-
tion of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct."); MODEL RULES, supra 
note 3, Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities ("A lawyer is ... an officer of the legal system 
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice .... A lawyer's 
conduct should conform to the requirements of the law."). 
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nonclients on legal matters. 10 This insulates members of the public from 
information concerning their legal rights and options.7 1 Even persons 
represented by an attorney face this problem because of the limited 
perspective and expertise of any one attorney. 72 No attorney or firm 
has a monopoly on ideas, or even a full range of expertise. Permitting 
solicitation of sophisticated persons will open the channels of infor-
mation to this segment of legal service consumers. In addition, the 
competition among attorneys can provide an important incentive for 
lawyer competency because prospective sophisticated clients will be able 
to evaluate to some degree the relative expertise of attorneys. 73 
Competition for sophisticated clients should also cause the cost of 
legal services to fall. 74 Lower bills not only benefit the legal service 
consumer, however, they also make lawyers appear more responsive 
to the concerns of clients and potential clients trying to reduce their 
business expenses. 75 The lower costs may also have indirect benefits 
70. The CPR closely regulates advertising, CPR, supra note 3, DR 2-101, and prohibits direct 
promotional communications with nonclients, id. DR 2-103, 2-104. The Model Rules are con-
siderably less restrictive than the CPR regarding advertising and promotional mailings, see MODEL 
RULES, supra note 3, Rules 7 .1, 7 .2, but are equally strict regarding in-person solicitation, see 
id. Rule 7.4. 
71. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Of course, the ethical rules do not prohibit 
lawyers from giving unsolicited advice; they merely proscribe the acceptance of employment resulting 
from such advice. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 458 (1978). In theory, therefore, 
the public is not insulated from information about legal rights and alternatives. In practice, however, 
absent the prospect of employment, lawyers have little incentive to offer unsolicited advice. See 
Pulaski, supra note 4, at 59. • 
72. In addition, by limiting contacts with persons who already are represented, those persons 
have less opportunity to learn about service and price options. See Francis & Johnson, supra 
note 36, at 267. 
73. A sophisticated client can compare lawyers based on their presentations and their familiarity 
with the types of legal problems facing the solicited client. In addition, a sophisticated client 
can assess background and other information about lawyers to help determine their relative 
expertise. 
74. A recent survey showed that both lawyers and consumers believe that advertising would 
result in higher prices for legal services. See Linenberger & Murdock, supra note 51, at 226. 
Yet, studies of legal clinics that advertise have indicated that such clinics offer lower priced ser-
vices without lowering the quality of service. See Murdock & Linenberger, supra note 51, at 
657-58. The effect of advertising on the cost of legal services to consumers therefore seems 
uncertain. 
These studies, however, considered the costs of fairly routine services offered to persons unable 
to evaluate the quality of services. Nevertheless, one study showed that 85D7o of consumers would 
not necessarily rely on price in choosing a lawyer. See Linenberger & Murdock, supra note 51, 
at 226, 228. On the other hand, sophisticated clients who have knowledge of their legal needs 
and can judge the expertise of soliciting attorneys can rely more on costs when choosing among 
competing attorneys. This will likely force competitive attorneys to react to cost concerns and 
lower their prices. See Francis & Johnson, supra note 36, at 267 ("[L)imitations on advertising 
restrict the opportunity of a potential client to purchase legal services based upon considerations 
of price and quality, leaving lawyers little economic incentive to lower their prices."). 
75. See Chayes, Greenwald & Winig, Managing Your Lawyers, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 
1983, at 84; "Managing" Company Lawsuits to Stay Out of Court, Bus. WK., Aug. 23, 1982, at 54. 
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to the legal profession, such as discouraging businesses from using 
nonlawyer employees to handle routine legal problems. 76 
By permitting the solicitation of sophisticated persons, the legal pro-
fession can display its ability to regulate itself effectively while taking 
steps to improve its public image and respond to concerns of legal 
service consumers. The ABA can do this without neglecting its con-
cern for protecting potential clients from overreaching and deception 
or its responsibility for maintaining the dignity of the judicial system. 
Ill. "SOPHISTICATION": A STANDARD TO GUIDE 
ATTORNEYS 
Implementing a new standard for the solicitation of sophisticated 
clients is essential to responsible self-regulation by the bar. Nevertheless, 
because of the dangers inherent in lawyer solicitation, 11 the ABA must 
exercise caution in relaxing restrictions on soliciting. The standard that 
Justice Marshall suggested in Ohralik, permitting noncoercive and 
informative, or "benign," solicitation, 78 offers inadequate guidance for 
practicing attorneys. A general standard of "sophistication" will suf-
fer from the same weakness. Establishing a bright-line rule for 
sophistication therefore represents one way to administer the proposed 
amendment effectively. A bright-line rule can accommodate both the 
need for caution in relaxing solicitation rules and the demand for clear 
guidelines to assist attorneys79 without complicating the enforcement 
of solicitation restrictions. 80 
76. See Chayes, Greenwald & Winig, supra note 75, at 85, 87-88; "Managing" Company 
Lawsuits to Stay Out of Court, supra note 75, at 60, 65. Greater reliance on lay organizations 
for certain services increases financial pressures on lawyers, see Francis & Johnson, supra note 
36, at 241-42, and challenges the ability of the bar to ensure competent service, see CPR, supra 
note 3, Canon 3, EC 3-1 to 5. Becoming more price competitive may therefore help to preserve 
the autonomy of the bar in regulating the practice of law. 
77. See supra notes 22 & 34 and accompanying text. 
78. 436 U.S. 447, 472.(Marshall, J., concurring). See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying 
text. 
79. The vagueness of the current ethical rules has been a probJem in regulating attorney con-
duct. See What Lawyers Are Doing to Shed a Bad Image, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 
23, 1982, at 53. Without clear rules on who can or cannot be solicited, attorneys face the dilemma 
of soliciting persons at the risk of violating ethical rules, or not soliciting at all. Neither alter-
native is desirable .. The bright-line test proposed, see infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text, 
eliminates the dilemma. 
80. Problems with enforcing restrictions on in-person solicitation were a major justification 
for upholding the prophylactic rule in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457, 464-67 
(1978). See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 
191, 206-07 (1982). With a bright-line test, a bar association or disciplinary committee can easily 
determine whether a certain in-person solicitation was proper. Because the proposed rule affects 
those unlikely to be harmed by solicitation, see infra text accompanying note 89, and likely to 
recognize and report improper conduct, see supra note 49, concerns about remedial measures 
raise no serious difficulties. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
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Although sophisticated persons can be described, 81 identifying them 
is considerably more difficult. A rule allowing solicitation of 
sophisticates must determine what persons are sophisticated. As a star-
ting point, attorneys presumably qualify as sophisticated persons; 82 
therefore, any in-person solicitation of another attorney should fall 
within this rule. 83 Similarly, a lawyer should be allowed to solicit any 
corporation that employs in-house counsel, because the corporation has 
available to it the sophistication and expertise necessary to evaluate 
the soliciting lawyer. 
Because valid restrictions on lawyer solicitation arise largely from 
the desire to protect consumers, 84 existing consumer protection laws 
provide guidance in defining sophisticated persons. Notably, businesses 
are considered so sophisticated that consumer protection laws have not 
been extended to them. 85 Although the legal profession could likewise 
treat all businesses as sophisticates, a more realistic view would exempt 
smaller, less complex businesses from the sophisticate category, 86 thus 
81. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
82. B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 4, at 164. 
83. Thus, any lawyer can contact another attorney regarding the representation of the attorney 
or his business. Insofar as a lawyer approaches other practicing lawyers for referrals, this in-
volves solicitation of a sophisticated person not as a prospective client but as an intermediary, 
raising other ethical concerns. See CPR, supra note 3, DR 2-103(C) ("A lawyer shall not request 
a person or organization to recommend or promote the use of his services .... ") (no counter-
part in the Model Rules). To the extent that the solicited attorney acts as an authorized agent 
for a business or other person, however, such solicitation should be allowed. See State Bar Grievance 
Adm'r v. Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 281 N.W.2d 469 (1979). 
84. See supra notes 20-22 & 33-36 and accompanying text. 
85. For example, the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976), covers 
"consumer" transactions, which are those "primarily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses." Id. § 1602(h). In addition, the act expressly exempts transactions "for business, [or] 
commercial ... purposes." Id. § 1603(1). See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(p), 226.3(a) (1982). 
The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) has a 
similar limitation. It governs only those products for sale to consumers or for "personal use, 
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a ... household or residence, a school, 
in recreation, or otherwise." Id. § 2052(a)(l). 
Other consumer protection legislation also limits protections to nonbusiness transactions or 
activities. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U .S.C. § 2301(1) (1976); U .C.C.C. § 1.301(11)-(15) 
(1974); UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 4 (1978) (also covering 
transactions "that relate to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money 
or property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has not been previously 
engaged"); 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.l(a), 701.l(b), 702.l(b) (1982) (consumer product warranty regula-
tions having some express exclusions of products purchased "for commercial or industrial use"). 
That businesses do not need such special protections has not been overlooked by the courts, 
see Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 58 F.R.D. 373, (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("Businessmen ... are 
sufficiently sophisticated to recognize legal harm to themselves."), and legal commentators, see 
Note, supra note 63, at 1150. 
86. Although businesspersons are presumably more so.phisticated than ordinary consumers, 
see supra note 85, the knowledge and expertise needed to make an informed selection of an 
attorney may differ significantly from the knowledge and expertise related to their businesses. 
The point at which a businessperson becomes adequately sophisticated obviously cannot be deter-
mined precisely. This uncertainty may therefore warrant additional protections for those smaller 
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ensuring that only businesses of a certain size and complexity would 
be open to lawyer solicitation. The amount of total sales87 or the number 
of employees88 of a business can serve as indicia of whether that business 
is "sophisticated." 
Although this standard will not eliminate all the dangers of in-person 
solicitation, it does identify a group that is not susceptible to the harmful 
effects of these dangers. Furthermore, those attorneys, corporations 
with in-house counsel, and qualifying_businesses that are solicited still 
will be protected by the general standards in the ethical rules. 
Specifically, sophisticated persons can rely on existing prohibitions 
against misleading or deceptive communications by lawyers89 and against 
soliciting persons when circumstances make them unable to make 
rational judgments. 90 If the bar perceives a need for more protections, 
one approach might be to include a "cooling off" period after a solicita-
tion during which the prospective client can rescind any agreement for 
legal representation. 91 
Defining sophisticated persons as either businesses of a certain size, 
attorneys, or corporations with in-house counsel accords with com-
mon notions of the classes of persons not needing the protection of 
consumer statutes and fairly approximates the groups having the 
attributes of sophistication. 92 This definition also provides a practical and 
enforceable bright-line standard to guide attorneys in their promotional 
activities. 
businesses that encounter few laws or government regulations in their daily business dealings. 
87. The Securities Act of 1933, §§ 2(15)(ii), 4(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l5)(ii), 77d(6) (Supp. 
V I 981), relies on a similar standard in exempting certain sales of stocks from the act's registra-
tion requirements. The exempted sales are those to "accredited investors," which the regulations 
define in terms of net assets, net worth, or current and expected income. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 
(1982). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.50l(a) (1982). 
Providing the exact indicia of sophistication is beyond the scope of this Note, but a gross 
sales or total assets standard offers the bar an approach to establish a bright-line test that can 
still protect those potential clients most susceptible to the dangers of solicitation. 
88. No consumer protection act determines coverage according to the number of employees 
involved, but other laws do. See, e.g., Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) 
(1976) (only an employer "who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each 
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year" are covered by 
the act). Although the number of employees may have no direct relation to consumer protection, 
it does provide a gauge for the business's exposure to laws and regulations. This, in turn, can 
be an indication of the sophistication of potential clients in recognizing and understanding their 
legal problems. 
89. CPR, supra note 3, DR 2-!0l(A); MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 7.1. 
90. MODEL RULES, ·supra note 3, Rule 7 .3(b)(l). Although the CPR has no specific provision 
to this effect, it does prohibit nearly all solicitation, CPR, supra note 3, DR 2-104(A), and it 
must operate under Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
91. Such a protection could follow the regulations requiring door-to-door sellers to inform 
buyers of their right to rescind a purchase agreement during the three business days after a pur-
chase. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1982). See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-65, 464 n.23 (comparing in-person 
solicitation to other face-to-face sales). 
92. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of recent Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of 
commercial speech interests of attorneys, as well as the state interests 
in protecting consumers and maintaining the dignity of the judicial 
system, allowing solicitation of sophisticated prospective clients seems 
necessary. This Note proposes that the legal profession permit the 
solicitation of sophisticates. It also recommends a practical and 
enforceable bright-line rule that treats attorneys, corporations with in-
house counsel, and certain businesses as sophisticated persons. By adop-
ting this proposal, the legal profession will more closely comport with 
the proper restrictions on commercial speech and may indirectly benefit 
from improved client service and a better public image. In so doing, 
the bar will once again take the lead in establishing professional ethical 
standards for attracting business. 
- Victor P. Filippini, Jr. 
